Existing secure and privacy-preserving schemes for vehicular communications in vehicular ad hoc networks face some challenges, e.g., reducing the dependence on ideal tamper-proof devices, building efficient member revocation mechanisms and avoiding computation and communication bottlenecks. To cope with those challenges, we propose a highly efficient secure and privacypreserving scheme based on identity-based aggregate signatures. Our scheme enables hierarchical aggregation and batch verification. The individual identity-based signatures generated by different vehicles can be aggregated and verified in a batch. The aggregated signatures can be re-aggregated by a message collector (e.g., traffic management authority). With our hierarchical aggregation technique, we significantly reduce the transmission/storage overhead of the vehicles and other parties. Furthermore, existing batch verification based schemes in vehicular ad hoc networks require vehicles to wait for enough messages to perform a batch verification. In contrast, we assume that vehicles will generate messages (and the corresponding signatures) in certain time spans, so that vehicles only need to wait for a very short period before they can start the batch verification procedure. Simulation shows that a vehicle can verify the received messages with very low latency and fast response.
INTRODUCTION
A S the society is paying more and more attention to transportation safety and efficiency, it is crucial to provide vehicles with current information about traffic conditions. In recent years, a special instantiation of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) known as vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) has been brought out, whose primary goal is to enhance the safety and efficiency of road traffic. In VANETs, vehicles are able to communicate with each other, which dramatically increases their awareness of their driving environment [33] .
A typical VANET consists of three main kinds of entities, i.e., trusted authority (TA), roadside units (RSUs) and vehicles with embedded on-board units (OBUs). The TA is responsible for the maintenance of the entire system. RSUs are deployed along the roadside. They act as forwarding stations or perform some authentication work to alleviate the burden of the TA. OBUs help vehicles to collect and process the information related to their driving circumstances, and to communicate with other entities. There are three types of communication in VANETs: vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-roadside (V2R) and roadside-to-vehicle (R2V). VANET communication empowers vehicles in an unprecedented way. For instance, V2V and R2V allow a certain vehicle to gain a better understanding of its driving environment and thereby avoid accidents, jams or other troubles. In turn, V2R enables the vehicle to become itself a source of traffic information. Also, R2V and V2R can provide the vehicles with value-added services (e.g., internet access, navigation and real-time multimedia streaming applications [23] ).
The potential growth and the business opportunities of VANETs have attracted a lot of attention from both academia and industry [23] , [25] , [26] , [33] . However, benefits usually come with challenges. One of the most important challenges is security [34] , [41] . In VANETs, the messages transmitted are often life-critical. It is essential to ensure that the messages received by a vehicle are authenticated and non-repudiatable. Another main challenge is about privacy [14] , [16] , [24] , [37] . Vehicles are usually personal devices that are kept for a long time. If an attacker can link together the data sent/received by a vehicle, he can infer a lot about the personal behavior of the vehicle's usual driver [31] . Therefore, vehicle privacy must be protected. Nonetheless, security sometimes conflicts with privacy. The former requires knowing the origin of messages, while the latter requires that no entity (other than the message generator) can trace a message to its generator. Consequently, it is a challenge to find an optimal trade-off between security and privacy. In fact, conditional privacy is usually considered in VANETs. In other words, vehicle privacy is guaranteed under normal circumstances but, if a false message (one containing deceptive information) is found, the TA can retrieve the message generator's identity.
Besides security and privacy, aggregation of cryptographic witnesses is another challenge. In a VANET, a traffic management authority (TMA) monitors the vehicles and uses RSUs to collect messages from the vehicles. Based on those messages, the TMA can optimize the driving conditions of vehicles, e.g., by reducing the traffic congestion via adaptative switching of traffic lights depending on vehicle density, by estimating traffic jams and warning on them, etc. However, millions of vehicles may exist in a VANET, which implies that huge volumes of data may be sent to the TMA, thereby causing data transmission congestion and storage burden. Sophisticated techniques for regular message compression have been proposed in [22] , [50] . Yet these techniques do not work on cryptographic witnesses, because compression may destroy them (e.g., compressing a certificate destroys it). Hence, aggregating cryptographic witnesses is more challenging, so we will focus on it rather than on compression of regular messages.
Related Work
Extensive studies have been published [12] , [13] , [20] , [23] , [36] , [45] , [46] to realize conditional privacy-preserving communications in VANETs. Roughly, they can be classified into two categories: protocols based on pseudonyms and protocols based on group signatures.
In the first category, the foundational work was done by Raya and Hubaux [33] . They proposed a concrete protocol based on traditional signatures and anonymous certificates, in which pseudonyms are used to hide the real identities of users in traditional certificates. Before verifying the validity of a signature, a verifier needs to check the validity of the corresponding certificate. Further, to achieve vehicle privacy, each pseudonym and its corresponding certificate must be short-lived. Otherwise, a vehicle could be tracked by a global attacker based on vehicular messages and the certificate. Therefore, vehicles have to store large amounts of anonymous certificates. Besides, vehicles can be corrupted by attackers. This implies a heavy certificate revocation management. To mitigate the certificate verification and revocation management costs, a popular approach is to use identity-based cryptography, in which the public key of an entity is just its identity (or pseudonym). However, most existing identity-based schemes are predicated on bilinear maps, which are costly to compute [42] . In [42] , an identitybased protocol which requires constant bilinear map operations is proposed. In this scheme, each vehicle can generate pseudonyms and corresponding private keys off-line. Nevertheless, the scheme requires that the system master key be loaded in an (ideally) tamper-proof device which is secure against any attacks. This is a very strong assumption (see [32] , [36] , [46] ). If the system master key is recovered by an attacker, the whole system will be at risk. Similar protocols can be found in [13] , [20] .
Protocols based on group signatures [9] are presented in [23] , [25] , [37] , [44] , [49] . In such protocols, a vehicle can sign messages on behalf of the whole group. No entity (other than the group manager) can distinguish the real signer among the group members. Therefore, protocols in this class can easily achieve conditional privacy. However, they face substantial communication and verification costs as well as the member revocation problem. The communication and verification costs of a group signature are much higher than the ones of a traditional signature. Further, if vehicles can be revoked, there is usually a high cost to check whether group members have been revoked or not; it may even be necessary to set up again the whole group. For a large-scale VANET, those costs seem too high in practice. We note that group signatures with verifier-location revocation [7] can be used to alleviate the member revocation problem. However, they have a limitation similar to the one of the schemes using certificate revocation lists: as the number of revoked vehicles in the system grows, they becomes very inefficient.
Batch verification [11] , [28] is widely employed in privacy-preserving schemes for secure vehicular communications to accelerate signature verification. It is useful if multiple signatures need to be verified at once. However, existing batch verification based schemes in VANETs assume that vehicles generate messages (and the corresponding signatures) at random time points [13] , [18] , [20] , [36] . A vehicle may receive only a few messages in a short time span. Therefore, to take full advantage of the batch verification technique, a vehicle usually has to wait to get enough messages, which results in additional delay.
Compared to efforts on security and privacy in VANETs, the literature on aggregating vehicle-generated cryptographic witnesses is rare. By applying short signatures in the PKI setting, Zhu et al. [48] proposed a protocol for aggregation of emergency messages in VANETs. Though the signatures can be aggregated into a single one, the certificates from different users cannot. This is problematic, as a certificate is much longer than a signature. Aggregation technologies are also used in [38] to enable each vehicle to verify the received signatures and corresponding certificates simultaneously. However, this scheme is designed for the PKI setting, so certificate management remains a problem. Aggregation techniques for identity-based cryptographic witnesses eliminate the need for certificates and hence reduce the transmission/storage overhead. However, the existing schemes in this class are based on strong assumptions that an attacker cannot recover the system master secret stored in the tamper-proof device [32] , [36] , [46] or they only consider the aggregation of cryptographic witnesses generated on the same message [19] . Further, the above schemes only handle cryptographic witness aggregation in a single entity. In the real world, the social organization usually has a hierarchical architecture. How to aggregate the cryptography witnesses by taking hierarchy into account is more challenging.
Contributions and Paper Organization
Existing VANET solutions that provide security and privacy face some challenges, e.g., reducing the dependence on ideally tamper-proof devices, building efficient member revocation mechanisms and avoiding computation and communication bottlenecks. This paper proposes a highly efficient identity-based aggregation and conditional privacy-preserving scheme for vehicular communications, which addresses the above challenges.
In our scheme, vehicles communicate with each other using short-term pseudonyms and without certificates, which alleviates the overheads of certificate verification, revocation management and storage. Short-term pseudonyms (and corresponding private keys) are issued by a TA called key generator center (KGC) and can be updated online through a protocol predicated on identity-based signcryption which offers efficient member authentication. With the short-term pseudonyms and corresponding private keys, a vehicle can anonymously generate identitybased aggregate signatures with one-time common strings (which are used when signing a message). To make sure the scheme works well, the vehicles have to obtain common strings synchronously. Otherwise, the merits of the chosen identity-based aggregate signature scheme cannot be fully exploited. This is achieved by our protocol for common string synchronization. All the messages signed under the same common string by different vehicles can be aggregated and verified simultaneously.
Our scheme enables hierarchical aggregation. In VANETs, a TMA has to collect the messages sent by vehicles for traffic analysis. Here, we consider a hierarchical architecture which includes a TMA center, sub-TMAs, RSUs and vehicles. Vehicles work as leaf nodes and broadcast signed safety-related messages. The messages signed under the same common string can be aggregated and verified by the nearby RSUs. The aggregated messages are later forwarded to the sub-TMAs for traffic analysis. A sub-TMA can reaggregate and verify the messages received from RSUs in its domain. The sub-TMAs may also forward urgent or important messages to the TMA center for a decision. The TMA center will perform the final aggregation and verification. In each aggregation step above, the aggregated signature is as short as a single signature from a vehicle. With our hierarchical aggregation technique, we significantly improve the performance of the system by reducing the computing/storage overheads of the vehicles and related parties.
Batch verification techniques (and aggregate signatures [8] 1 ) employed so far in conditional privacy-preserving schemes for secure vehicular communications all assume that vehicles generate messages at fully random time points. As a consequence, to take advantage of batch verification, a vehicle has to wait for a sufficient number of messages. However, the time cost of waiting for messages often overrides the savings of subsequent batch verification. Unlike the existing batch verification based schemes, we assume that vehicles generate messages close to certain time points. In our scheme, we divide each message sending period into two time segments with the same time span. A vehicle will generate a message only in the first several milliseconds of a time segment. By this mechanism, vehicles only need to wait for a very short period, and then they can start the batch verification procedure. Simulations show that our scheme has a low verification delay and a low loss rate. Therefore, our scheme achieves signature (hierarchical) aggregation, batch verification, and low latency.
We note that our scheme is mainly designed for periodically generated messages (i.e., messages containing driving information of a vehicle such as speed, location and direction). A vehicle, occasionally, may also broadcast non-periodically generated (emergency) messages, (e.g., hard brake message). For such messages, a vehicle can use the current common string to generate the corresponding identitybased aggregate signature scheme and send out the signed message. A receiver can verify the message independently and immediately.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate the system architecture, the security and privacy requirements and some related technical preliminaries. Our concrete scheme is proposed in Section 3. Section 4 proves the security of our scheme, and its efficiency is evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 compares our approach with the scenario of fully random message generation. Section 7 is a conclusion.
BACKGROUND

System Architecture
Our system consists of four main entities, i.e., KGC, TMAs, RSUs and vehicles. The system architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
The KGC is a trusted authority. It bootstraps the whole system. All the vehicles and RSUs have to register to the KGC before joining a VANET. RSUs are deployed along the roadside to assist the communications among vehicles and the KGC. Vehicles move on roads. They communicate with each other, RSUs or the KGC via RSUs. A sub-TMA collects the messages from the vehicles through RSUs. With these messages, the sub-TMA optimizes the driving conditions of vehicles. Urgent or important messages are forwarded by the sub-TMAs to the TMA center for a decision. The V2V, V2R and R2V communications use wireless networks based on IEEE 802.11p [1], [40] . The rest of 1. For the difference between batch verification and aggregate signature, please refer to [15] . However, since an aggregate signature scheme allows a verifier to verify multiple signatures at the same time, we still call an aggregate signature scheme is a scheme which supports batch verification.
communications are through wired links which enjoy high bandwidth, low delay and low bit error rate.
Design Goals
Many kinds of attacks threaten the system (e.g., message replay, message modification, movement tracking). To avoid these attacks, several security and privacy features are needed:
Message authentication. A message receiver should be able to check that the received message is unaltered and the message generator is a legitimate entity in the system. Non-repudiation. The message sender cannot deny having sent the message. Message confidentiality. All sensitive communications should remain inaccessible to anyone other than the senders and the corresponding receivers. Privacy. Under normal circumstances, a message receiver should be unable to guess the real identity of the message generator or distinguish whether two messages come from the same generator. This implies that an attacker cannot trace a vehicle based on the received messages. Traceability. The generators of false messages should be traceable. To this end, an authority should be able to disclose the real identity of a message sender when there is a dispute. In our scheme, the KGC will fulfill this role. Besides the above traditional security and privacy requirements, this paper addresses the requirements of fast response and cryptographic witness (signature) aggregation:
Fast response. Once the messages sent by nearby vehicles have been received, an entity must start the verification procedure as soon as possible. Low transmission/storage overhead. It must be possible for an entity to aggregate the received messages, especially the cryptographic witnesses. Furthermore, it must be possible to a higher-level aggregator (e.g., TMA) to re-aggregate the aggregated messages.
Identity-Based Public Key Cryptosystem, Aggregate Signatures and Signcryption
Identity-based public key cryptosystems (ID-PKC) are introduced to eliminate the certificate management problem in traditional PKI-based public key cryptosystems [7] , [35] . In an ID-PKC, the public key of an entity is just its identity (and usually some auxiliary information, e.g., validation period). The private key of the entity is generated by a trusted authority referred to as KGC based on the identity of the entity. In VANETs, we can use a driver's license number as the real identity of a vehicle and the location of an RSU (e.g., street namejjcity name) as the identity of the RSU. In this paper, we will employ identity-based aggregate signatures and identity-based signcryption to guarantee the security of the system. An aggregate signature scheme is a signature scheme that supports aggregation: given n signatures on n messages under such a scheme, these signatures can be aggregated into a single signature whose size is constant and whose validity implies the validity of the n signatures. To verify that the n signatures are respectively valid for the n original messages, the verifier just needs to verify the aggregate signature. In this paper, we use an extended identity-based aggregate signature scheme [17] for secure vehicular communications. The scheme in [17] is the most efficient of its kind but, in order to fully exploit its efficiency, all the signers in an aggregated set must obtain the same one-time-use common string when signing a message. However, due to the high mobility of vehicles, it seems hard for them to get such one-time strings. We therefore propose a protocol for common string synchronization. Every verifier is then able to aggregate a set of signatures under the same common string and verify the signatures simultaneously. We note that the aggregate signature scheme in [17] is implemented with symmetric pairings. However, asymmetric pairings have better security properties and can lead to considerably shorter signatures/ciphertexts than symmetric pairings. To enjoy the advantages of asymmetric pairings, we convert this scheme into one based on asymmetric pairings.
A signcryption scheme [10] , [47] combines the functions of digital signature and encryption, i.e., confidentiality, message authentication and non-repudiation. Further, some signcryption schemes also satisfy 'ciphertext anonymity' whereby a ciphertext hides the identities of both the sender and the recipient from third parties. This property can be used to achieve the privacy requirement in VANETs. Though a signcryption scheme combines digital signature and encryption, its computational cost and communication overhead are much smaller than those of sign-then-encrypt schemes [47] . In our proposal, we will employ an extended identity-based signcryption scheme in [10] to help vehicles update their pseudonyms and corresponding private keys. This signcryption scheme has been proven to satisfy confidentiality, message authentication, non-repudiation and ciphertext anonymity. We note that the signcryption scheme in [10] is also implemented with symmetric pairings. We convert it into one based on asymmetric pairings.
Pairings
Most of the existing identity-based schemes use pairings (a.k. a. bilinear maps). Let G 1 , G 2 be two additive cyclic groups and G T be a multiplicative cyclic group, all with the same prime order q, and P 1 , P 2 be random elements in G 1 and G 2 , respectively. A pairing is a mapê :
There exists an efficient algorithm to computeêðP 1 ; P 2 Þ. If G 1 ¼ G 2 the pairing is symmetric; otherwise it is asymmetric.
OUR SCHEME
In this section, we describe our proposal for secure vehicular communications. To simplify the presentation, we collect in Table 1 the notations employed in the rest of this paper.
High Level Description
At a high level, our proposed scheme can be described in terms of four protocols: system setup, protocol for STP and STK distribution, protocol for common string synchronization, and protocol for vehicular communications.
In the first protocol, the KGC sets up the whole system. It generates the system global parameters and the master key. For each registering vehicle, the KGC generates a long-term pseudonym LTP and the corresponding private key LTK. Each RSU also needs to register to the KGC. However, since the privacy of an RSU does not need to be protected, the KGC just issues a private key for an RSU based on the real identity of the RSU. The second protocol mainly deals with the distribution of the short-term pseudonym STP and the short-term private key STK to a vehicle. According to [33] , an STP and the corresponding STK used for secure communications should be short-lived, so that frequent updates of the STP -STK pairs are needed in practice. We propose an online distribution protocol for vehicles to renew their STP s and corresponding STKs. The third protocol ensures that vehicles can obtain synchronized common strings when signing. The last protocol implements secure and privacy-preserving vehicular communications. In this protocol, a vehicle uses its STP s and STKs to sign messages under common strings by means of a modified identity-based aggregate signature scheme. A vehicle or an RSU is able to aggregate a set of signatures under the same common string into a single aggregate signature which can be verified at low cost. The signatures received by RSUs can be re-aggregated by sub-TMAs and the TMA center. Finally, if a false message is found, the KGC can find the real identity of the message generator.
System Setup
The KGC maintains a member list ML and bootstraps the whole system as follows: 1) On input a security parameter ', generate two cyclic additive groups G 1 and G 2 and one cyclic multiplicative group G T all with the same large prime order q.
Let the generator of G 1 be P 1 and the generator of G 2 be P 2 . It is required that there exists a bilinear map e : G 1 Â G 2 ! G T and a computable isomorphism c from G 2 to G 1 with cðP 2 Þ ¼ P 1 [6] . 2) Choose a symmetric encryption/decryption scheme E k ðÁÞ=D k ðÁÞ. 3) Select six hash functions H 1 : f0; 1g Ã ! G 1 ; H 2 :
f0; 1g Ã ! G 2 ; H 3 : f0; 1g Ã ! Z=qZ; H 4 : f0; 1g Ã ! f0; 1g l 1 ; H 5 : f0; 1g Ã ! f0; 1g l 2 ; H 6 : f0; 1g Ã ! f0; 1g l 3 : 4) Choose ðz; Þ as the system master key, where z 2 Z=qZ and is chosen from the key space of E k ðÁÞ=D k ðÁÞ.
where ID kgc is the identity of the KGC. 6) Set pub ¼ ðG 1 ; G 2 ; G T ;ê; P 1 ; P 2 ; U 1 ; U 2 ; c; H 1 $ H 6 ; E k ðÁÞ= D k ðÁÞ; l 1 ; l 2 ; l 3 ; ID kgc ; P kgc Þ as the system public parameters. A vehicle V i has to pre-load the system public parameters pub and register to the system. When V i registers to the system, the KGC chooses a symmetric key k i from the key space of the symmetric encryption scheme, and generates an LTP (e.g., valid for one month) and the corresponding private key as follows: 1) Choose a long time period LP i (e.g., ½01:2015;
02:2015).
long-term private key. 3) Distribute ðk i ; LTP i ; LTK i Þ to V i and add the record ðID V i ; k i ; LTP i Þ to ML. When V i receives ðk i ; LTP i ; LTK i Þ from the KGC, it computes P V i ¼ H 1 ðLTP i Þ. Then V i stores ðk i ; LTP i ; LTK i ; P V i Þ locally.
Each RSU also needs to pre-load pub and register to the KGC. For an RSU R j , the KGC computes B j ¼ zP R j as R j 's private key, where P R j ¼ H 2 ðID R j Þ and ID R j is the real identity of R j .
Protocol for STP and STK Distribution
To protect the privacy of a vehicle, the STP and the corresponding STK of the vehicle should be changed frequently. Thus, numerous STP -STK pairs will be needed. However, if a huge number of STP -STK pairs are stored in a vehicle (e.g., STP -STK pairs for one year), it can be a huge burden to revoke such pairs in case the vehicle is corrupted. Here, we propose a protocol predicated on identity-based signcryption [10] to ensure that vehicles are able to securely reload STP -STK pairs via nearby RSUs. In our protocol, the vehicles only request STP -STK pairs for a short period (e.g., one day) [26] . Note that the LTP and the corresponding LTK of a vehicle may also expire. This protocol allows the vehicle to update its LTP -LTK pair as well.
In this protocol, we assume that: i) a secure channel is pre-established between an RSU and the KGC; ii) the RSU is semi-trusted, i.e., curious but honest. In our protocol, for practicality, the secure channel can be generated using an authenticated key agreement protocol. The protocol consists of four phases: Request, Verify, Reply and Update. In the first phase, a vehicle prepares a request, the request is then signcrypted based on the identity-based signcryption The message concatenation operation È
The exclusive-OR (XOR) operation t i A timestamp scheme in [10] and sent to the nearby RSU. In the second phase, the RSU verifies the validity of the signcrypted request on behalf of the KGC. If it is valid, the request is forwarded to the KGC. In the third phase, the KGC issues STP -STK pairs for the vehicle. If the LTP and the corresponding LTK of the vehicle are about to expire, a new LTP -LTK pair is also generated. Finally, in the last phase, the vehicle updates its STP -STK pairs (and the LTP -LPK pair if required). Fig. 2 illustrates these basic ideas. Suppose that a vehicle V i requests fresh STP -STK pairs via its nearby RSU R j , whose identity is ID R j . The protocol runs as follows:
[Request] V i issues a request as follows:
1) Set the request m i ¼ ðn i ; LTP i ; t i Þ; where n i denotes the number of fresh STP -STK pairs that V i requests. 2) Signcrypt the request as follows: a) Choose r i 2 Z=qZ, and compute
[Verify] In this phase, R j verifies whether V i 's request is valid. Specifically R j does: 1) For a single signcrypted request ðY i ; y i Þ, first decrypt the request by computing
then check the validity of the timestamp t i in m i , and compute
where LTP i is extracted from m i and B j is the private key of R j . 2) Verify whether the signature is valid by checkinĝ
If the equation holds, forward m i to the KGC through a secure channel; otherwise, abort. The correctness of the above signature verification follows from direct algebraic manipulation.
[Reply] For each request m i ¼ ðn i ; LTP i ; t i ), the KGC recovers the record ðID V i ; k i ; LTP i Þ from ML, and extracts LP i from LTP i . KGC generates n i STP s and corresponding STKs, and returns an encrypted reply to V i via R j . If LP i is about to expire, a new LTP and the corresponding private key are also returned to V i . Specifically, the KGC goes through the following steps: 1) Select a validity period vp i (e.g., the current day). 2) For 1 j n i , set sid i;j ¼ E ððLTP i jjjÞ È H 6 ðvp i ÞÞ and STP i;j ¼ sid i;j jjvp i : 3) For each STP i;j , compute the corresponding STK STK i;j ¼ ðT i;j;0 ; T i;j;1 Þ ¼ ðzP i;j;0 ; zP i;j;1 Þ;
where P i;j;0 ¼ H 1 ðSTP i;j ; 0Þ; P i;j;1 ¼ H 1 ðSTP i;j ; 1Þ: 4) If LP i is about to expire, generate a new LTP , say LTP 0 i , and the corresponding LTK, say LTK 0 i , and compute Re i ¼ E k i ðLTP 0 i ; LTK 0 i ; vp i jjðsid i;1 ; STK i;1 Þjj Á Á Á jjðsid i;n i ; STK i;n i ÞÞ;
otherwise, compute the ciphertext Re i ¼ E k i ðvp i jjðsid i;1 ; STK i;1 Þjj:::jjðsid i;n i ; STK i;n i ÞÞ: 5) Send Re i to V i as the reply.
[Update] When V i receives the reply Re i , it decrypts Re i by computing D k i ðRe i Þ to extract ðvp i jjðsid i;1 ; STK i;1 Þjj:::jjðsid i;n i ; STK i;n i ÞÞ or ðLTP 0 i ; LTK 0 i ; vp i jjðsid i;1 ; STK i;1 Þjj:::jjðsid i;n i ; STK i;n i ÞÞ;
for 1 j n i , V i sets STP i;j ¼ sid i;j jjvp i ; V i stores ðSTP i;1 ; STK i;1 Þ; . . . ; ðSTP i;n i ; STK i;n i Þ in the vehicle;
Protocol for Common String Synchronization
The protocol for vehicular communications in the next section assumes that vehicles can obtain synchronized common strings when signing. A common string is a (unique) string which is used when signing a message. In our scheme, all the messages signed under the same common string can be aggregated and verified simultaneously. However, messages under different common strings cannot be aggregated and batch verified. In other words, the messages received by a vehicle in a short period can be verified in a batch iff all the messages are signed under the same common string. Further, to guarantee the security and efficiency of our system, it is required that a common string be of onetime use. In this section, we propose a protocol for common string synchronization based on vehicle clocks.
Existing secure and privacy-preserving communication protocols in VANETs assume that vehicles generate and sign safety messages periodically (e.g., every 100 ms) but at fully random time points. Since vehicles send messages periodically rather than continuously, we can restrict the time spans in which they generate and sign safety messages. In this case, we could use the information related to the time spans as the common strings.
Assume the vehicles have access to (loosely) synchronized clocks which have the format MS:S:M:H:D:M:Y: We divide a message sending period d into t time segments. Each segment is d=t ms long, i.e., the k-th segment covers the interval ½kd=t; ðk þ 1Þd=tÞ ms; 0 k t À 1:
In this paper, we assume the message sending period is 100 ms. A common string is defined to be k:n:S:M:H:D:M:Y;
where 0 k t À 1; 1 n 10 (n is the number of the message sending period within the current second). The time point for a vehicle to generate and send a safety message is restricted to the first several milliseconds of a time segment. We define this period to be t s . However, this creates a new problem. If the time segment is too long (e.g. ¼ 100 ms) and the vehicle density is high, a vehicle may receive a huge number of messages in a short period, since all the vehicles must generate and send safety messages in t s of the same time segment. This will result in a large verification latency. Further, if t s is short, this will result in a high channel congestion rate. On the other hand, if the time segment is too short (e.g. 10 ms), only a few messages will be received by a vehicle, and the benefit of the batch verification cannot be well leveraged, which will result in message loss. In Section 5, we will show how to choose t and t s .
We note that our idea is similar to time division multiple access (TDMA) [4] , [21] , [29] , which is a kind of controlled access protocol used for channel acquisition in the MAC layer. TDMA periodically divides the signal into different time slots, so that several transmitters are able to deliver their personal contents during their individual time slots to the receiver(s). Our main goals are to generate synchronized common strings and accelerate the response to vehicle-generated messages, which are goals different from those of TDMA.
Protocol for Vehicular Communications
Vehicles need to communicate with each other to share their information on driving conditions. This section proposes a secure and privacy-preserving protocol for vehicular communications.
The message format is illustrated in Table 2 . The "Payload" field includes safety-related information, such as acceleration, direction and position. "Timestamp" is used to defeat the message replay attack. Further, as defined in the protocol for common string synchronization, the common strings are generated based on the timestamps. The "TTL" field is the Time To Live, which records a timer denoting how long this message will remain in the system. "ID" is a pseudonym of a vehicle. The "Signature" field is a signature on the first four fields. It requires that the signature be valid under the pseudonym of the vehicle.
The protocol has five phases: Sign, Verify, Store, Re-aggregate and Trace. In the first phase, a vehicle generates a signature on PayloadjjTimestampjjTTL under a synchronized common string. In the second phase, all the signatures computed under the same common string are aggregated and verified in a batch. In the third phase, if the signatures are valid, the messages and corresponding aggregate signature are stored. Re-aggregation of signatures may occur in the fourth phase. In the last phase, if a false message is found, an efficient algorithm can determine the real identity of the message generator. Fig. 3 illustrates these basic ideas. The detailed protocol is as follows:
[Sign] Suppose the safety message is m j ¼ PayloadjjTimestampjjTTL, and the current STP -STK pair of a vehicle V i is ðSTP i;j ; STK i;j ¼ ðT i;j;0 ; T i;j;1 ÞÞ:
V i first extracts the current common string CS based on the Timestamp, then performs the following steps: 1) Compute P CS ¼ cðH 2 ðCSÞÞ and c j ¼ H 3 ðm j ; STP i;j ; CSÞ: 2) Choose a random r j 2 Z=qZ and generate the signature ðS j;1 ; S j;2 Þ on m j , where S j;1 ¼ r j P CS þ T i;j;0 þ c j T i;j;1 ; S j;2 ¼ r j P 1 :
3) Broadcast M j ¼ ðm j jjSTP i;j jjðS j;1 ; S j;2 ÞÞ.
[Verify] An entity may receive many messages in a very short period, since safety messages are broadcast periodically. Suppose n messages ðM 1 ¼ ðm 1 jjSTP 1 jjðS 1;1 ; S 1;2 ÞÞ; . . . ; M n ¼ ðm n jjSTP n jj ðS n;1 ; S n;2 ÞÞÞ with the same common string CS are received by an entity. The entity verifies the messages as follows: 1) Compute S 1 ¼ P n i¼1 S i;1 ; S 2 ¼ P n i¼1 S i;2 ;P CS ¼ H 2 ðCSÞ: 2) For 1 i n, compute P i;0 ¼ H 1 ðSTP i ; 0Þ; P i;1 ¼ H 1 ðSTP i ; 1Þ and c i ¼ H 3 ðm i ; STP i ; CSÞ: 3) Check whether the following equation holds [17] :
If it holds, accept these messages.
[Store/forward] If the above n messages are valid, an entity does not need to store/forward all of them ðM 1 ¼ ðm 1 jjSTP 1 jjðS 1;1 ; S 1;2 ÞÞ; . . . ; M n ¼ ðm n jjSTP n jjðS n;1 ; S n;2 ÞÞÞ. Instead, it just needs to store/forward ððm 1 jjSTP 1 Þ; . . . ; ðm n jjSTP n ÞjjðS 1 ; S 2 ÞÞ:
We note that the last field ðS 1 ; S 2 Þ has constant size.
[Re-aggregate] When a sub-TMA or TMA center receivest aggregated messages ððm 1 1 jjSTP 1 1 Þ; . . . ; ðm 1 n 1 jjSTP 1 n 1 ÞjjðS 1 1 ; Pnî j¼1 cî j Pî j;1 ; U 2 Þ holds. If it holds, accept these messages. If the above messages are valid, the TMA stores ððm 1 1 jjSTP 1 1 Þ; . . . ; ðm 1 n 1 jjSTP 1 n 1 ÞÞ; . . . ; ððmt 1 jjSTPt 1 Þ; . . . ; ðmt nt jjSTPt nt ÞÞ jjðS 1 ; S 2 Þ in its local database.
[Trace] A vehicle may send false messages for its own profit or to disrupt traffic. Therefore, it should be possible to trace the real identity of the vehicle which generated the false message. Suppose the false message is the i-th message in ððm 1 jjSTP 1 Þ; . . . ; ðm n jjSTP n ÞjjðS 1 ; S 2 ÞÞ:
Assume also the aggregate signature is valid (falsehood is in the content of the i-th message, but the signature of that message was valid). The KGC runs the following tracing process: 1) Extract sid i;j from STP i , since STP i ¼ sid i;j jjvp i . 2) Compute D ðsid i;j Þ ¼ ððLTP i jjjÞ È H 6 ðvp i ÞÞ: 3) Compute LTP i jjj ¼ ððLTP i jjjÞ È H 6 ðvp i ÞÞ È H 6 ðvp i Þ: 4) Search ML to find a tuple ðID 0 V i ; k 0 i ; LTP 0 i Þ that satisfies LTP i ¼ LTP 0 i . 5) Output the real identity ID 0 V i .
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that the proposed scheme meets all the security and privacy requirements described in Section 2.2. We just need to deal with the protocol for STP and STK distribution and the protocol for vehicular communications. The relation between the protocol for STP and STK distribution and the protocol for vehicular communications is that the private keys used in the second protocol are transferred using the former one. We note that the secret keys (private keys and ephemeral secrets) used in two protocols are independent. Hence, we can prove the security of our system in two steps. The first step is to prove that the protocol for STP and STK distribution is secure and the second step is to prove that the protocol for vehicular communications is secure.
Theorem 1. The protocol for STP and STK distribution satisfies message confidentiality, message authentication, non-repudiation, vehicle privacy and traceability.
Proof Sketch. This protocol is based on the identity-based signcryption scheme in [10] , which captures the functions of both digital signature and encryption. In fact, the identitybased signcryption scheme in [10] is proven to satisfy confidentiality, message authentication, non-repudiation and ciphertext anonymity under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the computational Diffie-Hellman assumptions. It is easy to see that the protocol for STP and STK distribution satisfies message confidentiality, message authentication, non-repudiation and vehicle privacy. Further, the KGC is able to find the real identities based on LTP s; hence, the protocol also satisfies traceability. For the detailed security analysis, please refer to the supporting materials for this paper in [43] .
We note that in this protocol RSUs are used to help the KGC in verifying the requests from vehicles. The LTP of a vehicle is leaked to its nearby RSU, so the RSU could trace a vehicle using the vehicle's LTP . However, by our setting, a vehicle only runs this key distribution protocol once a day; therefore, an RSU can trace a vehicle only rarely. Further, if we set the validity period of LTP short enough (e.g., one day), the LTP of a vehicle can be viewed as a onetime pseudonym. In this case, even if all the RSUs colluded, they could not trace a vehicle. Proof Sketch. The underlying signature scheme is essentially the identity-based aggregate signature scheme in [17] , which is proven to be secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. It is easy to see that message authentication and non-repudiation are satisfied. As to vehicle privacy, STP s are used to hide the real identity of a vehicle; each STP is only used for a short time period to avoid vehicle tracking. Further, the KGC (and only the KGC) is able to determine the real identity of a vehicle from a certain STP . Thus, traceability is satisfied. For the detailed security analysis, please refer to the supporting materials for this paper in [43] .
SIMULATION
This section evaluates the performance of our scheme through several simulations by using NS-2 [2] , VanetMobisim [3] and the cryptographic library MIRACL [27] . The notations in our simulations are listed in Table 3 . The simulations were run on a Linux machine using an Intel Core i7-4790 K at a frequency of 4 GHz. We implemented a BN curve of embedded degree k ¼ 12 and 256-bit q. In all the simulations, the road scenario is an area of 1 km Â 1 km represented in Fig. 4 . Vehicles are randomly distributed in this area with speeds ranging between 50 and 60 km/h. The maximum communication range of each vehicle is set to 300 m. The channel bandwidth bound is 6 Mbps. The size of each message is 204 bytes. For each simulation, we set the simulation time to 100 s.
Message Delay
The average message delay D msg reflects the average time latency for a message to be received by another vehicle after it is generated. Using the notations in Table 3 , D msg is defined as:
In our scheme, we assume vehicles will generate messages in t s of a time segment. Therefore, after t s þ D msg in a time segment, few messages will be received by a vehicle. The average message delay must be taken into account to set the time interval for a vehicle to perform a batch verification. Fig. 5 shows how the message delay D msg in our protocol varies with vehicle density, different time segment lengths and t s . From this figure, it is easy to see that: i) D msg increases with vehicle density for all time segment lengths and t s ; ii) for a fixed vehicle density, D msg increases with the length of the time segment. For all densities and segment lengths tried, D msg stays below 3 ms. It seems reasonable to set the time D msg for a vehicle to start a batch verification as 3 ms after t s of a time segment. However, in the real world, vehicles will not generate messages strictly synchronously. Therefore, D msg should be greater than 3 ms. In fact, existing protocols for time synchronization may control the synchronization error within 1 ms [5] . However, due to the individual differences of vehicles, we allow vehicle clocks greater flexibility. In this paper, we take D msg ¼ 5 ms.
Verification Delay
We define the verification delay as
where D t is the average waiting time of a message before a batch verification and is related to t s and D msg . It reflects the average time latency for a message to be verified by another vehicle after it is generated. Obviously, D ver should be smaller than MAD. From Fig. 6 , it is easy to see that D ver is much smaller than MAD in all the cases. Further, D ver increases as the length of a time segment grows.
Verification Loss Rate
The verification loss rate R loss is defined as
Verification loss occurs when the messages received by a vehicle in a batch period cannot be processed before the next batch verification. From Fig. 7 , it is easy too see that when the length of a time segment is greater than 50 ms, the verification loss rate tends to 0. Therefore, we suggest to take a 50 ms long time segment.
Messages Received by a Vehicle
In our scheme, we assume vehicles will generate and sign messages in t s of a time segment. If t s is too short while the time segment is long, then lots of messages should be transmitted in t s , which will result in channel congestion. Fig. 8 shows the relation among messages received by a vehicle in 100 ms, t s and the segment length. Obviously, the messages received by a vehicle grow with vehicle density. Further, the messages received by a vehicle Maximum number of messages received in t that can be processed. n l Total number of messages that l received in t decrease when t s gets shorter and the segment gets longer. When the segment length is 100 ms, t s ¼ 10 ms and the vehicle density is 300/km 2 , the number of messages received by a vehicle is much smaller than in other cases. This implies a high channel congestion rate. When t s ! 20 ms and the length of a time segment is 50 ms, the number of messages received by a vehicle for the same vehicle density stays almost the same. Therefore, we suggest to take t s equal to 20 ms.
COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the verification delay of our scheme with the scheme based on the traditional batch verification method (with fully random message generation). For better comparability, the scheme we compare with also uses the (extended) identity-based aggregate signature scheme in [17] . However, vehicles generate messages at fully random time points. Further, we assume the messages received by a vehicle in a batch use all the same common string so that the vehicle can verify the messages simultaneously. Fig. 9 shows the relationship among the average verification delay D 0 ver , the vehicle density and the batch period, where and D t is the average waiting time of a message before a batch verification. By comparing Figs. 6 and 9, it is easy to see that D 0 ver is much larger than D ver for the same batch period. If we set the time segment to 50 ms and t s ¼ 20 ms, then the scheme in Section 3 is about 1.45 times more efficient than the scheme based on traditional batch verification. We note that taking shorter batch periods would reduce D 0 ver but it would have the drawback of increasing the verification loss rate, as discussed next. Fig. 10 shows the relationship among the verification loss rate R 0 loss , the vehicle density and the batch period, where
n t n l :
It is easy to see that the verification loss rate is high when t 40 ms and vehicle density is high. In particular, when t ¼ 10 ms, the verification loss rate goes towards 1. This is due to the fact that too short a batch verification period does not allow completing the batch verification within the period (as some messages may arrive randomly during the entire period). When t ! 50, the verification loss rate goes towards 0. By comparing Figs. 7 and 10, we find t ¼ 50 ms is the optimal batch period in both schemes. Fig. 11 shows the relationship between the received messages per vehicle and the vehicle density when the batch period length is 50 ms. It is easy to see that when seg = 2 (or the batch period length is 50 ms) and t s ! 20 ms, the number of messages received with our scheme of Section 3 is comparable to the number of messages received with random message generation. This implies that, when seg = 2 and t s ! 20 ms in the scheme of Section 3, only a few messages are lost due to the compression of message generation and transmission time.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed an identity-based scheme for signature hierarchical aggregation and fast response to anonymous vehicle-generated messages. In our scheme, all the vehicles and RSUs are identity-based, which alleviates the overheads of certificate verification and management. The vehicles in our scheme generate an aggregate signature based on synchronized common strings within a short time span. With this mechanism, the transmission/storage overhead of an entity is significantly reduced, and a vehicle only needs to wait for a very short period before it can start the batch verification procedure. Simulations show that our scheme has very low latency and enables a fast response to anonymous vehicle-generated messages.
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